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Introduction 
Experiencing life in contemporary western society where computers and smartphones 
dominate the day-to-day lives of everyone around us always runs the risk of becoming an 
unexamined fact of the world itself. Besides encountering the occasional incompetent family 
member or neo-Luddite, familiarity with new types of digital technology, like new apps, games, 
and hardware, seems universal. Certainly not all communities, even in the western capitalist 
world, have access to these technologies, as financial constraints and cultural differences can 
discourage the prevalence of digital devices. Even so, evaluating the social and material impacts 
of digital technology seems to be becoming a genre of literature all in itself, even if that only 
applies to a subset of society. Many arguments have been made about the use of screen 
technologies and how they are perceived and interacted with by individuals.1 A large public 
discussion has formed around the understanding of these topics that highlights the influence 
technology has on its users.2 However, phenomenological thinking regarding computers and 
smartphones is useful to uncover some overlooked aspects of digital technologies and how such 
aspects might affect how the user’s experience. Moreover, the way technologies are incorporated 
                                                          
1 James Bridle, New Dark Age: Technology, Knowledge and the End of the Future, (London: Verso Books, 2018). 
2 Tristan Harris, "How Technology Hijacks People's Minds - from a Magician and Google's Design Ethicist," Tristan 
Harris.com, May 19, 2016, http://www.tristanharris.com/2016/05/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-minds - from-a-
magician-and-googles-design-ethicist/.; Anil Dash, "12 Things Everyone Should Understand About Tech," Anil 
Dash.com, April 7, 2018, https://anildash.com/2018/04/07/12-things-everyone-should-understand-about-tech/.; 
Chris Bailey, "Your Smartphone Is Chopping Your Life into Tiny, Less Meaningful Pieces," A Life of 
Productivity.com, August 14, 2018, https://alifeofproductivity.com/smartphone-is-making-your-life-less-
meaningful/.; Ezra Klein and Cal Newport, “Cal Newport on Doing Deep Work and Escaping Social Media,” April 
18, 2017, in The Ezra Klein Show, produced by Vox, podcast, MP3 audio, 1:20:18, https://player.fm/series/the-ezra-
klein-show/cal-newport-on-doing-deep-work-and-escaping-social-media. 
.   
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into one’s life changes that life. Transformation of a lifestyle is always complex and can 
(whether intended or not) occur in many different ways with different outcomes and effects.  
Without becoming too abstract and removed from the direct experiences of living with 
these technologies, the goal of this paper is to highlight some overlooked aspects of the 
experiences with screen-based digital technologies that are prevalent in the western world. 
Because functioning in the civil and social realms involves a large amount of dealing with 
computer applications and internet resources that are accessible with both smartphone and 
computers, I have chosen not to examine just a singular piece of equipment but instead to 
examine devices and features that are all part of the computer-based technology. There are many 
similarities between them: they often use application and ‘window’ based screen navigation, they 
are often manipulated with virtual ‘buttons’ and use scrolling as another form of ‘movement’, 
sounds often function as an indication of something accomplished or a prompt for action, and the 
list goes on. While it would be impossible to discuss the totality of things experienced with these 
technologies (much as completely dividing up experience in general is impossible), some 
common features like the ones stated above can have transformational effects on how I 
experience the world. The use of smartphones and digital computers is a complex topic that 
needs an analysis on its own terms, and this paper fulfills that need. 
We know that our use of technologies has changed the way we interact with the world 
(we often use digital maps instead of paper ones) and each other (we often spend time on social 
media), but the character of these relations remains ambiguous. How our technology-enhanced 
lives operate creates an existential transformation of ourselves as subjects.3 In this paper, I will 
                                                          
3 Peter-Paul Verbeek, “Postphenomenology of Technology,” in Philosophy of Technology, The Technological 
Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 
2014), 567, 571. Phenomenology has a history of being studied alongside existential philosophies. For technology, 
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trace the roots of postphenomenology and defend it as a useful framework for thinking about 
digital technologies. Within this framework, I will expand on previous postphenomenological 
studies to show how digital devices are often both acted through like tools and towards like 
texts.4 Postphenomenological description is philosophically important if it makes explicit some 
qualities of experience that may be overlooked, and this paper follows the purpose of 
postphenomenology in this regard. 
First, an understanding of some essential works of phenomenology and its challenges 
from postmodernist thinkers will help set the grounding for the discussion of how these 
technologies are important to look at firsthand. Secondly, the project of postphenomenology of 
technology will be defended as a useful framework for evaluating digital technologies. Finally, 
thinking about these technologies will yield some consequences about how to understand the 
integration of pervasive digital computer technologies into our everyday lives. 
Phenomenology and the Digital Life 
In any given day, the use of screen-based computer technologies is nearly continuous in 
navigating the activities and tasks of everyday life. To use a personal example, before noon on an 
average day, I have awoken to an alarm on my smartphone, communicated with various friends 
and family via social media apps like Facebook and Reddit, accessed my college’s online portal 
in order to check my grades and assignments, transferred money through a banking app, and 
printed an assignment through the use of a school-owned computer. I have also purchased a book 
and am even writing this paper through a word processing program that allows me to ‘sync’ it for 
                                                          
the former examines the human/world for meaning that is disclosed to consciousness or perception, whereas the 
latter examines the relationship for the elements which disclose how humans meaningfully engage with their world.  
4 The postphenomenological terms “embodiment” and “hermeneutic” correspond to these kinds of relations, but they 
are introduced later. 
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extra availability and access from any other computer connected to the internet. These 
technologies populate the lived world, but is this merely an improvement on the ways we 
accomplish our personal goals, or does the use of these artifacts5 alter our understanding of how 
to navigate the world? In other words, are these devices neutral in their impact on how we 
understand the world and our place in it?  
How goods are obtained, how individuals and institutions communicate, and the 
proliferation of online media is important from an existential perspective, because these things 
compose the way in which lives are conducted. The activities individuals engage in have 
formative roles in their perceptions of themselves and their individual worlds. The unintended 
actions performed out of habit, for example, had to have once been new. Another way that our 
activities change our senses of self is through empirical testing of our abilities. Once I understand 
that I can walk, then the whole ‘world of walkable places’ opens up. Interestingly, nothing about 
other people’s experiences per se has to change for this new world to become accessible to me; 
my ability to walk changes my sense of my own capabilities, which in turn alter my range of 
options of what to do and what experiences I can have. Thus, if what I am capable of doing is 
part of my process of interpreting the world, the world itself has a different meaning. If I am 
unable to walk and am presented with a situation that requires walking (like the use of a 
treadmill), the situation is one to which I must respond differently. In this way, I understand 
myself differently depending the experiences that I have in the world, which themselves depend 
on how I perceive my capabilities. 
If the primary structure of what is meaningful is based in experience, technologies that 
compose a large percentage of my experiences are especially important, since these devices are 
                                                          
5 Artifact is the word I have chosen to use when referencing a specific piece of technology to which I relate (and 
use). 
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different from my biological body in some way (even if that is just in the amount of time I have 
spent with each). When I spend 10 hours of my day working on my online coursework, that takes 
up a large percentage of how I exercise my capabilities (via the technology) during the day and 
connects it to the meaning-making process described above. Thus, it is because so much cultural 
and personal time and effort is invested into these experiences that they are properly identified as 
important variables of what navigating the world “is like.” With the exception of strict 
determinist accounts of technological progress, the impact of these artifacts largely depends on 
how they are used, and this contingent interaction is overlooked by empirical studies.6 I will next 
continue this line of inquiry as it applies to the digital artifacts that surround my experiences of 
the world. 
 The project of phenomenology is one that employs the rigorous description of 
experience as a key to understanding the mind’s impact on the structure of understanding 
concepts. This project was inseminated by Edmund Husserl’s work, and one of his most 
important concepts is the intentional correlation between noesis and noema. Firstly, this means 
that consciousness is always “of something.” It never exists on its own terms but is composed of 
both the direction of consciousness (noesis) the objects and world (noema) which manifest in 
experience. There is no “pure” consciousness because describing this would entail describing 
what appears to consciousness, but there is a way in which the objects of consciousness (noema) 
are ‘intended’ towards, which is the noetic quality. Understanding consciousness in this way 
demonstrates a related point. Experiences, meaning the most immediate elements of what ‘is’, 
are subjectively undeniable. I might not know if I am dreaming or not, Descartes points out, but I 
know that I am something as something is having this experience. Because consciousness is 
                                                          
6 Verbeek, “Postphenomenology,” 562. 
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always intentional (consisting of something), it is identical with experiencing.7 Therein, the 
starting point of phenomenology is not to address the issues of hidden drives or objective beings, 
and these are set aside and ‘bracketed’.8 Given this, the relationship between the world and its 
objects (noema) and the ‘area’ of experience (which has its grounding in the body as well; the 
noesis) is actually a correlation. The implications of such is that changes in either affect the 
other. Right away, this point connects to technology, because the world populated by 
technological experiences is a world which is inhabited by different objects of our conscious 
experience, which is a different consciousness. Some of those objects are front and center in our 
experience—like the plot of the story I am reading—but others are present as ‘relief’ to make the 
experience function normally, as I cannot focus on every experience at once. Some examples 
would be the chair I sit in, the computer screen I stare at, and my habitual capacity to scroll down 
the page when I’m finished with this screen’s contents. My exposure to various objects then 
becomes part of the general way in which I understand the world at large. For example, the 
constant access to photos and simple editing software facilitates the proliferation of memes and 
‘meme culture’. Becoming familiar with this format and some of its common iterations results in 
individuals that have these memes as a referential context of interpreting the world. However, to 
an older generation, memes may seem like poorly done Photoshop images and not ways in which 
to understand the world. Another, less obvious example is in the nature of screen-based artifacts 
themselves, which often function in the background. The edges of the screen often point towards 
ways to access a different display, often instantaneously. My familiarity with this way of 
experiencing text (via websites or word processing programs) makes me someone whose concept 
                                                          
7 If a thing is not conscious for me, then I cannot experience it (cannot even speak of it), and if it is not experienced, 
then I cannot be present to consciousness. 
8 Edmund Husserl, “Pure Phenomenology, its Method, and its Field of Investigation,” in The Phenomenology 
Reader, eds. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney, 124-133 (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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of what a text can be is expanding to mean different things than for someone who has not 
experienced text through screen-based technology. These examples show how phenomenology 
starts from the experiences understood by living in the world (lifeworld) instead of some 
pretense of objective or abstract discourse, as this ‘lifeworld’ as it is experienced cannot be 
chopped up and quantified in the way objectivity would require.9 
Heidegger’s Essence of Technology 
A return to some classic texts of phenomenology is helpful for reorienting the discussion 
around this lived experience. A foundational work in the existential phenomenology of 
technology is The Question Concerning Technology, by Martin Heidegger. In this work, he 
discusses the supposed essence of technology. By starting with the overall goal of uncovering 
technology’s essence, Heidegger’s conclusions pertain to the principles behind the operation of 
many technological artifacts. Importantly, this is in contrast to views that isolate certain 
technological tools themselves from a larger context of use, assuming that they are neutral in 
their effects. Instead, he connects themes and ideas that manifest in how technology feels 
integrated into the lives of many people. While Heidegger’s arguments have been criticized by 
many, this essay has a crucial role in the development of the philosophy of technology, and many 
of the arguments in it continue to bring up relevant points.  
Technology, for Heidegger, is an example of a more fundamental disposition towards the 
world. He states that “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we 
passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we 
                                                          
9 Edmund Husserl, “The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy by Inquiring back from the 
Pregiven Life-World,” in The Phenomenology Reader, eds. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney, 151-174 (New 
York: Routledge, 2002). 
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regard it as something neutral…”10 He subsequently examines two common conceptions of 
technology: as a means to an end (the instrumental) and as a human activity (the 
anthropological).11 While he considers both to be correct, they do not sufficiently relay what the 
“instrumental” is itself; they are not ‘true’ in the sense of depicting technology’s character in the 
most accurate way. Heidegger is questioning the governing principle behind technology, and he 
returns to the post-Aristotelian conception of cause as comprising four distinct versions: the 
material (what something is made of), formal (the organization or shape of material that 
distinguishes it from other objects), efficient (the process and agent which transforms the object), 
and final causes (the goal or telos). Reimagining cause as ‘how something comes about’ allows 
him to discuss the nature of instrumentation, which is this ‘bringing-forth’ (facilitating 
something). Heidegger is abstracting ‘backward’ from specific technologies into more general 
categories in order to encompass all forms of technology and reach its essence. 
Technology in its instrumental capacity is a way of ‘revealing’, which Heidegger takes to 
mean a process of casting the world in a certain light, which makes the world a place to do 
specific kinds of things. The instrumental is a specific kind of revealing, because to facilitate 
something (this is what instrumental is effectively doing) requires some basis in knowing the 
character of the world. Revealing is linked to the idea of knowledge, for that which facilitates 
ability requires familiarity with its different aspects, and conversely, the facilitation itself 
establishes itself into the world as something which can be done.12 In other words, what is 
possible is inseparable from what one knows how to do. In this way, technology is a process that 
                                                          
10 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology.” in Philosophy of Technology, The Technological 
Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 
2014), 305. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 308. 
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discloses13 some truth about the world. It is never the truth because Heidegger views the world as 
something that can be revealed in many different ways.14 The technological mode of revealing 
the world has specific ways that it approaches the world, and these will be what Heidegger tries 
to identify. 
 Heidegger distinguishes modern technology (for him, industrial artifacts like 
hydroelectric dams) from artisans’ tools (like a paintbrush or a hammer). The kind of revealing 
that the large industrial technologies facilitate is that which turns nature, or what is given, into 
stockpiles of resources to be made available for later use.15 Technology is a way of appropriating 
the world for human use. Once the world that is non-human (constructed for the purpose of 
understanding) is appropriated into intelligibility through technology, the world that is left is one 
without mystery and can be ordered for use whenever it is needed. Heidegger views this essence 
of technology as ‘enframing’ or ordering the world by means of ‘unconcealment’. Ordering 
presents a danger to the freedom of humans in that it places everything nonhuman into those 
stockpiles able to be called forth upon the request of humans.16 Freedom comes from being able 
to engage with the world in meaningful ways and placing the world into terms of ‘standing 
reserve’ transforms all objects into subjective capabilities which limit other types of 
engagements. For example, constant access to the alarm clock and calendar features of a 
smartphone takes all the time in a day and makes us accountable for each hour, as we are always 
aware of the time and can have the clock notify us whenever we ‘set’ it. The way knowledge 
contains a claim about the function of itself (what the knowledge or ability is for) then comes to 
                                                          
13 “Disclose” is here meant to describe both the affirmation that there is a world and the way we come to know its 
character. The correlation between noesis and noema helps in thinking about this statement because there is no 
perception without there being something perceived. To disclose the character of the world is to position myself in 
relation to it is a specific manner. 
14 This is also why he returns to an Aristotelian four-fold causality. 
15 Ibid., 309. 
16 Ibid., 316. 
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dictate the actions of the individual by circumscribing the freedom to interact with the world in 
new ways. In the alarm clock example, being responsible for all of my time and punctuality 
forces me to interact with the world in this way, with time now placed into ‘standing-reserve’. 
Ultimately, Heidegger offers a hopeful solution to this dilemma: the capacity for growth on the 
individual level as well as the species level hinges upon the continued acknowledgement of this 
unfolding essence and a critical view of technology as opposed to an infatuation with it, or 
worse, viewing it only as instrumental.  
Heidegger’s historical view has been critiqued by subsequent philosophers in the way it 
generalizes not only about technological artifacts, but also implies some inherent relationship 
that humans have with them.17 While the way modern technology orders the world is important, 
and while it may stem from some more fundamental trend, this fundamental trend can itself be 
subject to change. Modern technology is not a variation on one specific way of approaching the 
world but a multifaceted, expanding notion that encompasses many distinct relationships, and 
these do not all belong to the same ‘essence’. For example, the mechanistic role of an oil rig 
would fit well into Heidegger’s essence, but the creative role of Photoshop (a product of modern 
technology) does not seem to work as enframing in that it encourages the creation of new kinds 
of images. Photoshop is manipulative of the world, but its role seems mischaracterized by saying 
that it is always involved with placing things into ‘standing-reserve’. On the contrary, Photoshop 
seems to be working towards the proliferation of wonder in its ability to create virtually any type 
of image. Photoshop could sometimes function as an enframing (i.e. if I only ever use its features 
                                                          
17 Cf. Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979); Don Ihde, "Heidegger on 
Technology: One Size Fits All," Philosophy Today 54, no. Supplement (2010): 101-05; Verbeek, 
“Postphenomenology”; Galit Wellner, "The Quasi-face of the Cell Phone: Rethinking Alterity and Screens," Human 
Studies 37, no. 3 (2014): 299-316; Asle H. Kiran, “Four Dimensions of Technological Mediation,” in 
Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, eds. Robert Rosenberger and Peter-
Paul Verbeek, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 123-40. 
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for marketing purposes or in constructing diagrams for functional purposes), but saying that 
enframing is its ‘essence’ does not allow for any creativity in its use. Both the oil rig and 
Photoshop are deemed technological developments, but their ‘essences’ do not seem to be part of 
the same type of engagement towards the world. One may contest Heidegger in this regard by 
refusing that there is an essence of technology.18 If his analysis of the essence of technology 
being nontechnological is correct, then the relationship people have to specific technological 
artifacts can be different if the interaction is part of a different nontechnological disposition. 
Grouping together all forms of technology as involved in the process of placing the world into 
‘standing-reserve’ limits the discussion of technology, because both the kinds of technologies 
that are included in its definition change as well as the way that any given artifact is used. The 
word ‘technology’ itself is merely conventional, and while it may give us an indication of its 
prima facie relationship to us, this can change depending on how we use it. 
Heidegger disagrees with the merely correct definitions of technology as failing to get at 
the essential theme among them, but his own definition could fall under this critique as well, as 
only applying to those industrial forms of technology that appropriate resources in favor of 
ordering the world for human purposes. Rather, one must evaluate case-by-case and allow for 
cultural contingency when examining technologies. Heidegger’s generalizations are only ever 
contingently accurate, due to their obfuscation of different facets of technology that may be more 
prevalent depending on one’s culture and the functional organization of the artifacts themselves. 
Considering that any single technology does not constitute the entirety of the human experience, 
any knowledge revealed by technology is always partial. If I use a computer to construct a 
spreadsheet to budget my finances, this may very well be analogous to the technologies that 
                                                          
18 See Verbeek, “Postphenomenology,” 570. 
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Heidegger critiques. On the other hand, my computer can be a place where I engage in games or 
learn about the world. Even within the same artifact, my experience of it can be different, and the 
revealing that it affords is also contingent, as the difference in activities can follow from different 
modes of approaching the world. 
Furthermore, while Heidegger’s view retains the existential character of phenomenology, 
his move away from the actual descriptive method of phenomenology is problematic. It is not 
clear that the push towards artificial intelligence or the use of video games function as an 
“unconcealing” that places the world into standing reserve. While there may be elements of this 
analysis that are correct, the essence applicable to all technology cannot be derived if it is 
contingent, as an essence must be something common to (and therefore continuous with) all that 
falls under its definition. Rather than beginning with the technologies themselves, he creates an 
argument that is more focused on categorizing ‘modes of being’ first, then placing specific 
examples into the framework.19 The divergent examples given earlier show why this is approach 
is limited in how technologies can be widely different in use.20 If phenomenology is to continue 
to be relevant, the ability for its descriptions to change in response to noematic changes must be 
preserved, as is seen in the contrast between the digital technologies and the industrial ones.  
                                                          
19 See Ihde, Technics and Praxis, 105, 109, 125. Don Ihde’s understanding of Heidegger shows how his “The 
Question Concerning Technology” lecture is actually rooted in his existential ontology in his larger work Being and 
Time. 
20 Here are some other examples of modern technology generating new ways of interpreting the world: Dylan 
Yadav, “Sigur Rós' ‘Route One’ Experiment Captures Iceland With Technology,” Immortal Reviews.com, last 
modified April 29, 2018, http://www.immortalreviews.com/home/2018/4/29/sigur-rs-route-one-experiment-
captures-iceland-with-technology; Gaetano Scippa, “John Moose, the Band You Can Listen to Only in a Forest,” 
LifeGate.com, last modified June 26, 2015, https://www.lifegate.com/people/lifestyle/john-moose-band-forest.  
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Merleau-Ponty and the Perceptual Revelation 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty represents a version of phenomenology that can account for 
these critiques of Heidegger by returning to the basic elements of perception. His focus on 
embodiment can show how relations with technology on a personal level is important in 
understanding them by their very use. We do not interact directly with the essence of technology. 
To think we do mistakenly places the abstract idea as primary and presents a static understanding 
of what technology is. Beginning with the experience of using any given piece of technology is 
important if its relationship to us is to be understood in an existential way. Heidegger’s appeal to 
historical modes of thought taints his insights too heavily, whereas Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of how perception reveals the world presents a more malleable framework for 
understanding. 
  In Merleau-Ponty’s work Phenomenology of Perception he claims, “The real has to be 
described, not constructed or formed.”21 It is the situated experience of myself in the world that 
contains ambiguity, but this ambiguity is not just a product of ‘rational ideas vs. empirical 
phenomena’. Transcendental idealism, the view that the mind can only have ideal knowledge 
about truth, is not really transcendental because it “guarantees the world…by regarding it as 
thought or consciousness of the world, and as the mere correlative of our knowledge, with the 
result that it becomes immanent in consciousness and the aseity of things is thereby done away 
with.”22 A shared identity between myself and the world is important for understanding 
technology insofar as we use technologies to engage with the world, and our use of technology 
means something about the nature of existence itself and not just our ideas about existence. 
                                                          
21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1962), x. 
22 Ibid., xv-xvi. 
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Furthermore, tools like the phenomenological reduction (the bracketing of things not immediate 
to consciousness) are useful but never completely possible because any theoretical severance 
between the world and consciousness is destined to fail. Merleau-Ponty thus excludes any notion 
of either purely subjective or purely objective discourse. 
Another important concept in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is that, while the world is not 
ambiguous in the fact of its existence, our situated relation to the world always involves shifting 
qualities of experiences that define the world we live in. The perception of ambiguity is just 
another reaffirming experience of the world; “We must recognize the indeterminate as a positive 
phenomenon. It is in this atmosphere that quality arises. Its meaning is an equivocal meaning; we 
are concerned with an expressive value rather than with logical signification.”23 It is 
disingenuous to approach this ambiguity as one in which our interpretive faculties are somehow 
mistaken, thus justifying a Cartesian doubt. Rather, it is merely another form in which the world 
is disclosed in perception, and this is our ambiguous world itself. Therefore, technology as 
something which alienates me from the world or myself is not tenable either, because the world 
already exists as this stable ambiguity that I experience by interacting with it. 
However, this does not prohibit insightful description of the world itself but rather 
indicates another aspect to perception worth considering. The example of color perception works 
here, because the signification of a color surpasses the “sensation”24 aspect by its interpretation, 
which is its “intentional” character.25 Perception is an active experience, not a passive one, 
meaning that what I perceive is not just received in consciousness but partially dependent on my 
engagement. An important component to this analysis of perception is the application of ‘gestalt’ 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 6. 
24 Merleau-Ponty disagrees with the use of sensation as a valid concept largely because of this point. 
25 Ibid., 13. 
15 
 
in perception. The gestalt is the manner in which both contextual and particular components are 
simultaneous elements in active perception. Because perception is not just a matter of 
synthesizing bits of information to compose a sensation but always contains some situatedness 
and selectivity, we cannot say that our particular elements of perception precede their emergence 
from the world.26 Instead, our experiences always presuppose previous experiences and only 
select “figures” from a “ground” that are interrelated. Gestalt as a concept is important for 
understanding the role of mediation/technologies in that it provides a way of addressing 
individual instances and objects while noting their inseparability from the synthesis of being. 
One might ask then: if indeterminate perception must be recognized as a positive phenomenon, 
does this refute the difference between the ground (world-context) and the specific figure? 
Merleau-Ponty uses gestalt as a replacement for ‘attention’, as it better accounts for the active 
role of perception of consciousness, and the indeterminate can exist as a point within that 
framework of shifting experiences. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of how perception integrates various figures and grounds 
actively (gestalt) is central for describing the existential role technologies play in our lives. 
Synthesizing my understanding about the world with my present ‘immediate’ figures of 
perception is important for the discussion of technology, because if I can use technology at all, 
then it must be integrated into my framework for interacting with the world. Moreover, the 
intentionality of perception ‘carries’ my sense of context and meaning of perceptions into the 
future (as it is a constituent element in pre-personal perception as well).  
In a famous passage from Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty says,  
the life of consciousness---cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life---is 
subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our 
human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in 
                                                          
26 Ibid., 16. 
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our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about the 
unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility.27  
 
The intentional arc with which perception and the consciousness integrates with the world is also 
intimately connected with (but importantly not identical with) the abilities of the body. It is an 
aspect of being that often escapes the empirical scholar, because it cannot be measured and 
labeled (or compiled empirically as required for supposed ‘objectivity’) as reality. It is the realm 
of possibility, and consciousness inhabits this space. Therefore, indeterminacy, experienced as 
such, can be understood through the interplay of figure and ground via active perception which is 
constantly recontextualizing through new figures that arise in perception. In the use of a 
smartphone’s digital interface, how I navigate through the different ‘windows’ engages this 
process as well, giving me a sense that its internal ‘world’ is a facet of my own. 
Continuing his account, Merleau-Ponty says that “knowledge thus appears as a system of 
substitutions in which one impression announces others without ever justifying the 
announcement, in which words lead one to expect sensations as evening leads one to expect 
night”28 The aspect of consciousness that surpasses pure ‘observation’ towards a picture (even on 
a digital screen) can account for anticipation and imaginative projection. Because consciousness 
includes these partial elements, as seen in the act of learning,29 Merleau-Ponty claims that both 
empiricism and intellectualism (rationalism) fail as complete accounts on their own. Instead, we 
are fundamentally entangled with the world, and interacting with it allows us to realize the nature 
of the world we inhabit. It is important here to remember that the existence of the world in 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 136. 
28 Ibid., 15. 
29 Ibid., 28. Consciousness in the act of learning is important because it is what accounts for differences in how we 
engage with the world. Empiricism refutes any reason for grasping (engaging with the world in new ways), meaning 
that there must be something about the nature of one’s existence that requires engagement with the world. 
Intellectualism ignores our incomplete understanding or the world. Both of these are solved through the gestalt 
framework. See Ibid., 30 36, 84. for the difference between construction and understanding;  
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general is irrefutable because of this claim. I will never ‘get lost in the virtual world’ and become 
a solipsist, because every aspect of consciousness presupposes the world in which my body 
exists. 
His view of perception also has consequences for our own ability to understand, and it 
becomes clear that degrees of insight are all that is available to consciousness given this 
framework. The body for Merleau-Ponty is a virtual grounding of one’s sense of spatiality and 
the pole around which the position of things is the world are organized.30 My “body schema,” the 
place where existence is oriented, is plastic to a certain degree. It has formed during the long 
habituation of its use. Walking, for example, is much different for me as an adult than as a 
toddler; a toddler must focus on the act of walking, whereas I often do not even recognize the 
walking itself, only where I am headed. Likewise, with the use of cell phones, computers, etc., 
my interaction with them often becomes invisible in all its actions when I am focused on using 
them to engage the world in a specific way. I ‘embody’ the physical cell phone when I am no 
longer aware of some features of my interaction with it (the buttons I am pressing or the way I 
am holding it). However, opacity in my integration with my various faculties is necessary for 
something like consciousness to exist, because experience needs a grounding or ‘pole’ of 
orientation for particular perspectives to arise in perception insofar as I am perceiving this and 
not everything. Therefore, there must be both transparency and opacity in the use of a 
technological artifact, as it allows me to focus on a particular set of tasks instead of being 
entirely focused on my biological body while maintaining a relationship with it. 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 100-01. 
18 
 
Consciousness emerges then between the polar extremes of the body and the object(s) of 
intention, which again is what gives rise to the “intentional arc” and the way of disclosing the 
world through navigation or motility.  
This configuration is understood in the following passage: 
If a being is consciousness, he must be nothing but a network of intentions. If he ceases 
to be definable in terms of the act of sense-giving, he relapses into the condition of a 
thing, the thing being precisely what does not know, what slumbers in absolute ignorance 
of itself and the world, what consequently is not a true ‘self’, i.e. a ‘for-itself’, and has 
only a spatio-temporal form of individuation, existence in itself. Consciousness does not 
admit of degree. If the patient no longer exists as a consciousness, he must then exist as a 
thing.31 
 
It is important to scrutinize the elements of this intentional part to understand the world at a 
meaningful level. How one navigates as the intentional perceptive arc involves the system of 
references that incorporates the lived world and recognizes the importance of a 
phenomenological method brought to bear on digital experiences.32 My very use of a computer is 
what gives our interaction a definite character. The world as lived constitutes the characteristics 
of consciousness and my situated existence, so the actions I take are fundamentally ones 
concerning the nature of the world I live in. 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception provides support for the connection 
between the navigated world in its form/structure and the existential implications of the way 
technologies open up new forms of experience, which transform our subjectivity: “These 
elucidations enable us clearly to understand motility as basic intentionality. Consciousness is in 
the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.”33 Our selves are inextricable from our 
abilities, and the structure of our abilities is multi-directional. The sensory apparatuses which 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 121-22. 
32 Ibid., 130. 
33 Ibid., 136-37. 
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dispose us towards a certain field of experiences are not just methods of interrogation but inform 
our consciousness of its own being. This insight is crucial to also understanding the 
postphenomenological method, because technology is never just a body extension without 
reconfiguring the definition of ‘body’. 
Therein, how one experiences the navigation of digital platforms constitutes the field of 
experiences one may draw from. What presents itself through these mediums is only part of the 
broader field of experiences, but the entirety of intentional consciousness comes to incorporate 
the insights from these specific ‘places’, especially when those places are frequented more often. 
Digital experiences (like navigating a webpage), even though they are certainly valid as 
‘authentic’, may often need interpretation, or at least resolution, of their influences on the rest of 
the intentional arc of ‘real-world’ navigation. It would be fallacious to argue for a pure 
disjunction of experiences between the virtual and the physical, which would place a hierarchy 
upon something inherently intertwined (consciousness and subjecthood). Nevertheless, taking 
them to be utterly equal is also incorrect, because the being that exists as a navigating entity 
embodied within the digital platforms is disposed differently through the conceptual 
relationships to ability, but even further through the alteration of fundamental perceptual 
faculties which informs the sense of position in nonvirtual instances. Locomotive performance of 
life tasks (going to the post office or grocery store, for example) often constitute a smaller 
percentage of one’s day-to-day activities when they are completed via digital technologies, and 
this is not without consequences.34 
Merleau-Ponty’s work represents an important insight of phenomenology in that it 
demonstrates a way of coming to understand some system from within, which is accomplished 
                                                          
34 Thus, there is a transformation, but not necessarily an expansion of my activities. 
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by movement or navigation within the system, and it discloses itself to consciousness in this 
way. However, because both the method of disclosure is subject to a change in parameters and 
consciousness is a relational being, this phenomenological discourse requires an on-going 
participation. The subjective perspective yields insightful existential fruits but does not account 
for the contingency of the subjectivity itself. Although it places brute empirical notions of 
understanding in brackets, assuming the subject position (which is essential to phenomenology) 
has been criticized as placing too much importance on a singular contingent perspective. 
Merleau-Ponty certainly describes differences in perceptual experience, but his method only 
accounts for a first-person perspective that is not primarily concerned with technology.   
Furthermore, while his account in Phenomenology of Perception describes the intentional 
motion of perception across a field, the manner in which one’s intentions select their objects can 
either be accounted for with some concept of freedom of the will, or they may be viewed as 
themselves contingent on one’s specific environment. This challenges the subject’s sovereignty 
in phenomenology and marks the radical departure from this method that poststructuralism 
represents. Although Merleau-Ponty does mention the contingency of subjectivity in relation to 
phenomenological description, 35 some have challenged the very legitimacy in doing 
phenomenology at all.36 While it may be true that the careful description of perception yields 
existential insights, these may actually be less profound if one considers that our very sense of 
self may be a production of something inaccessible through first-person perspectives. 
                                                          
35 Ibid., 61. “Reflection can never make me stop seeing the sun two hundred yards away on a misty day, or seeing it 
‘rise’ and ‘set’, or thinking with the cultural apparatus with which my education my personal history, have provided 
me.” 
36 See Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 117. 
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In describing the phenomenological projects of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 
experiential constitution of our relations with technology may be elucidated. Heidegger points to 
the way technological endeavors reflect a more fundamental attitude towards the world in which 
we live in, and essentialist themes in his work are particularly challenged by the poststructuralist 
writers. Their ideas are also important to the understanding of an existential relationship with 
technologies in how they challenge the relationship between the experiences that I have of 
something and the system which gives me my interpretation of it. With a piece of technology 
like a computer, what may appear to be my subjective sense of its elements and function may be 
a product of a larger relationship which conditions my subjecthood (and thus the way I behave 
with technology). Merleau-Ponty can inform the discussion in that the intentional perceptions 
divulge the nature of the existential being, but the challenge to phenomenology by 
poststructuralist writers needs to be accounted for. If we are to reach a relevant 
postphenomenology, it should retain its origins in these traditions for thinking about the 
subjective identity of a digital-technology user. 
The Challenge from Poststructuralism 
In the postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers of the later twentieth century, a challenge 
to the validity of phenomenology is presented. Granular descriptions of experience utterly fail as 
tools for reaching greater or more accurate access to our understanding of reality. To many of 
these thinkers, I (as a subject of experiences) am not some instantiation of a universal human but 
instead a being conditioned by my circumstances. The meaning of any experiences I can attest 
to, and even what I experience in the first place, is a product of my social conditioning which 
circumscribes the self through language, instituted social order, and the systems that produce 
knowledge (the scientific community, for example). 
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A problem with the classic phenomenological approach is that it assumes that 
philosophers can isolate the essences of experience and theses essences will be capable of being 
universally valid, or at least generally valid. Even in Merleau-Ponty, his account of perception 
focuses heavily on describing visual experience. Given the vast differences in cultural, 
environmental, linguistic, and social experiences, many have questioned whether 
phenomenology can really “bracket” these kinds of background determining experiences or if the 
phenomenologist is always a human indirectly reflecting his or her time, thus challenging the 
usefulness of doing phenomenology whatsoever. The descriptive method of the role 
consciousness plays in constituting experience is meant to expose the most fundamental and 
immediate facts of what can actually be experienced directly. Traditional philosophical 
argumentation often reaffirms some problematic assumptions or pretends to have some objective, 
non-situated position where philosophical ideas can be discussed. Heidegger’s conception of 
technology, for example, attempted to discover the essence behind technology while “reducing 
concrete technologies to nontechnological things such as ‘technological thinking’ or ‘the system 
of mass production,’ with technology itself, in the end, falling out of the picture.”37 The 
importance of having a specific technological artifact to discuss without homogenizing all of 
technology helps keep the discussion focused on immediate experiences of the world, but these 
immediate experiences are at most unconscious reproductions of socially conditioned biases. 
Postmodernism thus critiques phenomenology by arguing subjectivity is constructed 
socially. Within the phenomenological reduction, pure consciousness is never really pure but a 
reflection of the way the philosopher has been constituted by extra-experiential norms.  Thus, 
phenomenology is not a meaningful enterprise that can uncover less alienated experiences 
                                                          
37 Verbeek, “Postphenomenology,” 561. 
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because the self is circumscribed and constructed by social structures. Michel Foucault’s critique 
of valueless truth is an important point to consider in this regard. He views the role of the 
“middle region”38 between the fundamental implicit codes of perception (the perfectly bracketed 
experience) and explicit reflective knowledge (what phenomenological description attempts to 
do qua describing) as the space where the actual structure of truth relations take place. This is a 
challenge to phenomenology in that, in (ostensibly) describing some basic immediate 
experiences, this method pretends to be one pole (the starting point of presupposed schemas) 
while actually being the other (reflective knowledge). The importance of this point is that any 
description given to experience is inseparable from that “middle region” that has already 
conditioned this knowledge. No return to immediate experiences is possible, because even the 
beginning codes of immediate perceptions are products of the previously overturned changes in 
order. Therefore, the space between implicit codes of meaning and the explicit representations of 
knowledge to consciousness is what organizes experience and constitutes it in the subject’s 
understanding. The way in which truth is produced undercuts the authenticity of the 
phenomenological description, because the subject (the ‘I’) is contingent upon the system that 
conditions the meaning of experiences. 
Foucault describes the character of this region in the Preface to his book The Order of 
Things: 
A system of elements – a definition of the segments by which the resemblances and 
difference can be shown, the types of variation by which those segments can be affected, 
and, lastly, the threshold above which there is a difference and below which there is a 
similitude – is indispensable for the establishment of even the simplest form of order. 
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, the 
hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also that which 
has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language; and it 
                                                          
38 Michel Foucault, “Preface,” in The Order of Things (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), xxi. 
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is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though 
already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression.39 
 
Foucault is identifying something “anterior to words, perceptions, and gestures,”40 but it is also a 
concrete phenomenon that can be referenced. He calls this the ‘episteme,’ and it relativizes any 
discussion of the subject in that it locates an anterior order which circumscribes it. Our very 
sense of what a subject is, which in phenomenology is actually the ultimate grounding for 
everything else, is not revealed to us from our experience but from the episteme that governs a 
certain era and locale. Why should it matter how I experience technology when my experiences 
and even the ‘me’ are conditioned by something more fundamental? The question is especially 
crucial considering that the episteme which produces subjectivity is not universal for all subjects, 
limiting my phenomenology (no matter how well it describes my subjective state) to only 
myself. Thus, the episteme may in fact be all that is reflected in a phenomenological description. 
Insofar as the phenomenological proceeds from the subject, its content will not identify the 
episteme as such. Any attempt to continue the relevance of phenomenology must account for this 
criticism. 
 The application of this type if philosophy could be in examining the way manufacturers 
unwittingly inscribe logical approaches into the computational relations of computer software 
that obscure parts of reality.41 For example, the author James Bridle says that “By reifying the 
concerns of the present in unquestionable architectures, computation freezes the problems of the 
immediate moment into abstract, intractable dilemmas; obsessing over the inherent limitations of 
a small class of mathematical and material conundrums rather than the broader questions of a 
                                                          
39 Ibid., xx. 
40 Ibid., xxi. 
41 See Bridle, New Dark Age, 4. Bridle sees this as thinking in terms of technical solutions to everything.  
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truly democratic and egalitarian society.”42 In this he examines the systemic structures which 
govern the digital world and shows how they also determine the subjective sense of the world, 
and that includes the technology itself.43 Computer technology changes our understanding of the 
world by both enforcing the idea that the world works in terms of micro-level instances of 
technical problems that have technical solutions and by ‘covering up’ the process by which these 
technical mechanisms work. Bridle takes the way that computer technology has developed into 
an extensive part of contemporary life as something which has shaped our very subjectivities, in 
this case instituted ‘computational thinking’44. In a similar way to the poststructuralist 
philosophers, Bridle isn’t as concerned with how we as subjects understand our experiences as 
much as he is focused on the larger systems of knowledge that cause us to think and become 
different selves while at the same time obscuring their role in doing so. 
Jean Baudrillard’s work Simulacra and Simulation reflects many themes of the 
poststructuralist era and the political and technological tumult of his time (1981), as well as our 
own. The central concept of the work, hyperreality, consists of an explanation of the semiotic 
severance between the real and its symbolic correlates. His understanding of how signs and 
information come to saturate existence is applicable with regards to the integration of 
technologies that are present in the digital world, because this is a world that is composed 
entirely of designed symbols that relate to each other. A smartphone is an example in how its 
interface is composed of images and tactile features that determine what any given feature 
means. By their interaction, the relationship between two features (the icon of an app and the 
                                                          
42 Ibid., 34. 
43 Ibid., 32. Bridle also seems to follow Foucauldian thought in the way this ‘order’ can supersede its governing 
capabilities by some excessive results that in produces.  
44 Ibid., 4. 
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vibration made when it is pressed for example) mutually reinforce their individual purposes and 
of the nature of the phone itself.  
Baudrillard’s concept of simulation invokes the circumscribed system of signs (of the 
world in general) that presents a hegemonic worldview which, by needing to represent the world 
so that it has meaning, controls the discourse. The precession of simulacra (the primacy of signs 
in experience) constitutes a sort of self-referential system.  
He states that,  
The universe itself, taken globally, is what cannot be represented, what does not have a 
possible complement in the mirror, what has no equivalence in meaning (it is absurd to 
give it meaning, a weight of meaning, as to give it weight at all). Meaning, truth, the real 
cannot appear except locally, in a restricted horizon, they are partial objects, partial 
effects of the mirror and of equivalence.45 
  
This echoes Foucault, and Baudrillard’s system does not allow any method for escape from this 
circular state of confusion. Here again is a challenge to phenomenology in that the appeal to a 
description of experience effectively precludes the success of the project from the start. Lived 
experience is seen to be nothing more than the local navigation between the most extreme signs, 
and this results only in confusion. Particularly with the introduction of media elements, the 
control of the discourse is exacerbated.46 
 In a world of simulation, confusion of the difference between what is real and mere 
simulation is universal, and in this situation the subject’s access to ‘reality’ itself is prevented.47 
                                                          
45 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994), 108. 
46 Ibid., 84. 
47 In this sense Baudrillard often seems to presuppose a ‘lost’ reality prior to the condition of simulation. If this were 
true, he would not be critiquing modernist ideas as deeply as Foucault. However, I have chosen to interpret 
Baudrillard to mean that it is our experience of reality as reality that is impossible with the precession of simulacra. 
As this condition is one where all meaning can be exchanged for any other (equivalence), our experience of the 
world is no longer one in which we experience it a world beyond signs of signs. This would be an existential 
critique, rather than a Foucauldian systemic critique. In this way Baudrillard challenges the possibility of even 
attempting a phenomenological account, as even the mere pretense of subjective experience is tainted by the 
hyperreal impossibility of unequivocal meaning. 
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No phenomenological description is possible either because it would only be describing the 
relationship between signs. 
Baudrillard states further on: 
It is no longer possible to fabricate the unreal from the real, the imaginary from the 
givens of the real. The process will, rather, be the opposite: it will be to put decentered 
situation, models of simulation in place and to contrive to give them the feeling of the 
real, of the banal, of lived experience, of the quotidian, but reconstituted, sometimes 
down to disquietingly strange details, reconstituted as an animal or vegetal reserve, 
brought to light with a transparent precision, but without substance, derealized in 
advance, hyperrealized.48  
 
 The critique of self-referential systems is also important in considering how a technology can 
create specific forms of understanding merely by having these internal relations. When the 
elements of discourse operate only in reference to each other, their relationship changes and can 
become exaggerated, as well as universal.49 Bridle shows this when he says, “Computational 
thinking…slipped out of view. It became unquestioned and unquestionable, and as such it has 
endured.”50 The challenge to the first-person perspective of phenomenology is clear: our digital 
technology has become so inaccessible to us that anything we say about it from a subjective 
point of view is at best a representation of representations, or simulation. 
To return to previous examples with the poststructuralist critique, the role that computers 
and smartphones have in my personal life is always contingent upon forces that shape my 
subjectivity. My ability to even question the normality or meaning of my use of a smartphone 
may be contingent on some arbitrary distinction between myself and technology. I can only have 
discourse concerning the nature of my relationship with a system of menus and screen-contained 
shapes if I am aware of their existence as objects of the world. Because of the designs which 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 124. 
49 Ibid., 92. 
50 Bridle, New Dark Age, 32. See also Bridle, New Dark Age, 34, 38. 
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have shaped my understanding, I am able to reference something that can be invalidated if 
discussed differently (such as talking about the role of binaries in computer technology 
constructing my understanding of logic or the ubiquitous access to facts via the internet shaping 
my idea of truth). My subjective sense of the computer is insightful only insofar as it channels a 
macro-level production of meaning, but this is still never truth in the sense of something 
invariant with the use of any specific piece of technology. On the other hand, if we give up the 
quest for truth and instead try to focus on something immediately relevant to our lives, the 
phenomenological understanding of our current technologies needs a different approach from 
Heidegger’s. 
Postphenomenology’s New Paradigm 
Postphenomenology51 attempts to combine the insights of the poststructuralist and 
phenomenological paradigms of thought, and it even uses empirical studies insofar as they are 
applicable. If the foundational method of perception as consciousness ultimately only leads into 
the structural networks of relationships, it still remains the only possible point of access 
regardless of the particular interpretation of its implications. The phenomenologist’s conclusions 
can be seen as problematic in their generalization of contingent situations, but to dismiss the 
entire approach of phenomenology in favor of poststructuralism is unnecessary and creates a 
false antithetical relationship. To deny phenomenology as completely irrelevant does not only 
deny the importance of a subject, but the existence of consciousness itself. Even if the subject is 
only a product of external structures in a particular time period, particular subjectivities are still 
important elements in the process of constituting subjectivity as they point to something about 
                                                          
51 Don Ihde credits himself with coining this term. See Don Ihde, “Preface: Positioning Postphenomenology,” in 
Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, eds. Robert Rosenberger and Peter-
Paul Verbeek (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015). xiii. 
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the system which produced them. Foucault’s explanatory framework does not discuss the 
particularities of firsthand experience, but the interaction between technology and subjectivity is 
an important component to any type of order insofar as it represents a pervasive activity socially 
and for each individual.52 The extent to which I continue to use a piece of technology is 
important, but how I experience my use of it is unimportant for Foucault. There is also the matter 
of how my understanding of my use of technology influences my use of a technology, and this 
may represent the lineage of poststructuralism in postphenomenology. However, 
postphenomenology is different from phenomenology in its existential examination because it 
does not claim authenticity or invariant elements of experience. It is also different from 
poststructuralism in that it wants to retain the importance of my experience of the world, even if 
that is ultimately a product of some larger order. How I understand myself is important to me 
regardless of whether it is relevant to truth claims. 
However, it is important to recognize that some aspects of phenomenology and 
poststructuralism must be substantially revised if not discarded. The authority of the 
phenomenological perspective regarding its direct access to experience is certainly rejected by 
scientific empiricism, as our larger experiential framework (intentionality) necessarily is not 
measurable by modeling the world.53 Poststructuralism generally rejects both as saying anything 
definite about the nature of things, so any ontological declarations or conclusions from firsthand 
experience about the definite nature of existence (consciousness/perception/etc.) must be denied 
by the poststructuralist thinkers (as well as Merleau-Ponty). However, the existential component, 
meaning the direct implication of experience to the world as it relates to living and constructed 
meaning would only be important to Foucault’s poststructuralism insofar as it produces action 
                                                          
52 See Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 124. 
53 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 23. 
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related to the maintenance of power structures, whereas Baudrillard may deny that this is 
possible at all. The experience of living out one’s subjective expression can be authentic even if 
that the sense of living in the world is an aspect of those systems that produce and circumscribe 
the definition of the subject.54 The question of how subjectivity emerges is answered differently, 
but the subjective as lived still remains an element in this configuration. In the first place, while I 
can attempt to uncover the hidden structures that are responsible for the constitution of the 
subject, as long as I continue to exist as a particular subject my experiences can be discussed as 
they are meaningful for me. Even in hyperreality, meaning as equivalent to all other meaning 
does not prevent me from experiencing it as such.55 Once I have discounted all attempts at 
discovering some positivist objective truth (a point common to both major schools of thought), I 
still have every justification for wanting to ‘figure out what my experience means to me’. 
Therein, there is reason to describe the lived experience even if this description is only 
existentially meaningful.56 Personal descriptions of experience operate as a way for myself to 
examine my relationship to aspects of the world, but insofar as descriptions have the capacity to 
bring elements of my own existence to the forefront of my consciousness, others may also be 
brought to think about experiences in the same way. While this eliminates the possibility of 
uncovering invariant elements inherent in consciousness, it also allows the existential meaning of 
my experiences to be discussed despite the challenge from poststructuralism. 
The discussion of technology that emerges in postphenomenology is interesting for 
several reasons: the conception of the self and its expression could be conditioned and altered by 
                                                          
54 As I have already discussed in Foucault’s work. 
55 Baudrillard’s description of how Disneyland functions within hyperreality is an example of how simulacra can be 
described as meaningful even if that meaning is ultimately empty in signifying anything ‘real’. 
56 Cf. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). While this text is not a work of postmodernism, it uses a phenomenological approach while 
also incorporating external forces which shape our subjectivity. For postphenomenology, accepting the contingency 
of generalized accounts does not prevent some existential meaning to ‘slip through’ in its descriptions. 
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the technology, the impact of any technology may not be the same between different 
subjectivities, and the distinction about what is considered technology may vary. How I relate to 
technology is of course important for my experience as well. For Don Ihde, 
“postphenomenological claims are never about the absolute foundations of reality or knowledge, 
and never about the “essence” of an object of study. Instead, postphenomenological claims are 
posed from an embodied and situated perspective, refer to practical problems, and are 
empirically oriented.”57 In attempting to overcome some of the issues of the two ways of 
thinking about the world (phenomenology and poststructuralism), postphenomenology is a way 
of taking up the relevance of philosophy for the individual’s day-to-day experience of living in a 
world populated by digital technology. 
Postphenomenology of Using Digital Technology 
Postphenomenology retains the existential focus of much of phenomenology, and while it 
does not attempt to answer with the level of exactness questions about the ontological structures 
of experience that is present in classic phenomenology, this gives it the ability to incorporate 
structural relationships and their effects on the subject and even consciousness, thus allowing for 
macro-level discussions to be relevant (although they aren’t always the focus of 
postphenomenological investigations).58 The discussion of technologies needs this because, 
despite their complete dependency on humans and the structure of their worldview, their effect 
on the world of the human is not entirely embodied or recognized within the intentional arc of 
the first-person perspective. 
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The way in which the construction of a technological medium expands the “phenomenal 
field?”59 always supersedes the designated function. It is not the case that the artifacts of 
civilization are nothing beyond the extensions of an inherent core of human agency and desire, 
even an output of foundational epistemology, but an active transformation of what it means to be 
in the world. This does not reject all notions of technological embodiment, but rather 
incorporates the expansions necessary for technology to be technology into the affective 
constructions of the subject and society. As Ihde has succinctly put as a contradiction, “I want 
the transformation that the technology allows, but I want it in such a way that I am basically 
unaware of its presence.”60 A reference back to Merleau-Ponty’s transparency/opacity of situated 
existence is helpful; just as with biological embodiment, in order to act through technology I 
must both be partially unaware of its mediation to focus on what it allows me to accomplish and 
partially aware of its opaque elements that transform my existing capabilities. Beyond this, Ihde 
claims that we also (contradictorily) strive towards complete transparency as our motivation for 
engaging with technology (and towards fully assuming our new capabilities). Characterizing 
relations with technology in this way is an important insight of postphenomenology, because the 
way in which I use technologies can be useful for thinking about how they are incorporated into 
my broader existence. 
The experience of navigating the online and digital environment is salient, because this is 
what constitutes my understanding of them. What direct connections exist between the user and 
the materials or beings that are engaged with is what constitutes the existential (or lived 
situation) connection between the organic being and its digital correlate (how my actions are 
                                                          
59 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 63. 
60 Don Ihde, “A Phenomenology of Technics,” in Philosophy of Technology, The Technological Condition: An 
Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014), 541. 
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represented digitally). In other words, the ways in which these digital interactions fit into the 
experience of an investigating consciousness is related to the meaning these artifacts make 
within a lifeworld, as has been discussed. Instead of bracketing the various abstract versions of 
socially transferable knowledge in order to understand the structure of consciousness or 
perception, postphenomenology is an attempt to incorporate lived experiences in a world where 
these technologies are a fact of the world, emphasize certain modes of perception, and seemingly 
have their own dispositions, albeit ones contingent on the human factor (barring true artificial 
intelligence). It is therefore not concerned with the project of ontology or essences, because what 
is expressed subjectively is existential and contingent. Technology is an appropriate topic in this 
because of its fundamentally inseparable nature from the human (given that it is designed by and 
used by humans). We cannot describe technology on its own terms. Therein, examining my 
experiences with my digital artifacts is something which must be returned to frequently in a 
postphenomenological description. 
Relations with Technology: Embodiment vs Hermeneutic Relations 
When I am browsing the internet via my smartphone, part of me seems to exist in a 
separate place.61 While the notion of authenticity is placed aside (is this more or less the 
‘authentic me?’), this realm is different in how I navigate through it, and my intentional 
experience (how my active perception works within it) is different as well. On the other hand, it 
is never entirely severed (I experience in both situations of course), so what results is the 
emergence of a distinctly formed being which transformed. How to understand this process and 
how to distinguish between the nature of digital experiences and the world of my biological body 
                                                          
61 See Ruth Rettie, "Presence and Embodiment in Mobile Phone Communication," PsychNology Journal 3, no. 1 
(2005): 16-34. 
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is a paradigmatic question of postphenomenology. One way of asking this is: how, when using 
digital technologies, do I relate my experiences back to either the virtual world or the physical 
one? The ambiguity between these options has the potential to create a distinct existential 
situation concerning the ‘grounds’ of experiences with these technologies, as I will discuss 
shortly. However, instead of viewing this as a ‘fracturing’ of a once-complete experience of the 
world, the previously mentioned gestalt framework helps to understand how our use of digital 
technologies only changes the specific qualities of our dynamic existence. 
One of the most important models in the postphenomenology of technology shows the 
relation of my existence to technology within the intentional structure. Technology as mediator 
between “human” and “world” varies depending on the piece of technology as how it is used. 
Don Ihde’s framework for thinking about human/technology relations is one of the most 
persisting and helpful ways of thinking postphenomenologically. I will here give a brief 
description of two relations that characterize human relations with technologies: embodiment 
relations and hermeneutic relations.62 Importantly, these are only helpful insofar as they describe 
repeated observations of specific technologies: they do not claim ontological status as 
fundamental ways of how human in general (must/always) relate to technology.  
Embodiment relations are those which maintain the world as perceptual terminus and are 
largely transparent in my perception.63 Technologies that I relate to in this way function as 
                                                          
62 Hermeneutics is a term historically designated to the interpretation of texts within their own cultural/historical 
context. Heidegger and Gadamer expanded on how the study of hermeneutics was applied to philosophy, and it 
began to denote the method of creating a context for interpretation of elements of any given system. Ihde also 
expands on the term, using it in a special sense in relation to technological relations. It is in this sense that I use the 
term, and do not claim to account for its historical usage. See Ian Bogost, Play Anything: The Pleasure of Limits, the 
Uses of Boredom, and the Secret of Games. Narrated by Jonathan Yen. (Newark: Audible, 2016), Audiobook. 
63 See Ihde, Technics and Praxis, 7. The perceptual terminus has to do with the noematic component to perception. 
For example, if I am confused about what a shape is or what it means, and then come to understand these things 
about it while I am looking at it, the perceptual terminus remains the same (i.e. the object itself) despite the 
perception as a whole being altered. 
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extensions of the body, although they are often very different in their capacities. Ihde models this 
as:  
(human-technology) → world.64 
An example of this is the way in which a smartphone’s camera allows for the preservation of 
visual and auditory experiences to be examined in a static form. Other examples may be the use 
of a phone to make calls (voice extension) or the recording of audio in order to remember or 
repeat the contents of the ear (often back to the ear). These characterizations can themselves 
contain different levels of transparency and opacity in the alterative effects of using the 
technology. In the most extreme cases, the embodiment becomes mostly transparent and 
becomes invisible to perception, such as the case with eyeglasses or clothing. The embodiment 
relation is a common form of relations and demonstrates Ihde’s earlier point about the way my 
drive towards transparency is an existential contradiction of wanting transformation and 
transparency. One thing to keep note of is that embodiment relations are concerned with the 
transparency of the artifact during my use and not with what the artifact is directing my 
perception towards.  
Another relation configuration with tech is the hermeneutic:  
human → (technology-world).65 
 Hermeneutic relations are different in that the perceptual focus is the artifact itself, and any 
conclusions resulting from its use are represented by the internal logic of the system in which 
they are arrived at. The use of a computer to organize files in a specific way or to access an 
anonymous social media website is an example of hermeneutic relations. While these actions still 
point to features of the world beyond the artifact in some way, they do not translate directly into 
                                                          
64 Ihde, “Phenomenology of Technics.” 559. 
65 Ibid. 
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an existing perceptual faculty. This is not to say that they are removed from perception either 
(how else would we engage with them?), but they are not forgotten in the transparency of the 
intentional perception: they themselves are the focus of the perceptual terminus. It is important to 
note that this distinction does not necessarily mean that the object itself is viewed as meaningful 
or problematic in itself.66 I can use a computer to set my calendar, read Wikipedia, or browse 
Reddit and have a sense that these tasks refer to something beyond my specific actions despite 
my perception being centered on the user interface67 of the computer. The way of acting either 
through an instrument or of perceiving its qualities directly creates too hard of a dichotomy; the 
hermeneutic relation, while existing as the perceptual terminus, “’refers’ beyond itself to what it 
represents.”68 Meaning circumscribed within this system can thus point outside of the piece of 
technology itself. Through the internal logic of website navigation, for example, I can plan out 
future action or learn about features of the world through Wikipedia or Reddit without having the 
structural characteristics of these websites as the focus of what is meaningful in the situation. 
The characteristics that remain at the perceptual terminus are also not the purpose of my web 
browsing; it is what is understood by reading text and other mechanisms of interaction (such as 
‘upvotes on Reddit’ or the way Wikipedia links to other content) that is the purpose of using the 
technology. As such, the artifact of the hermeneutic relation maintains the character of 
(technology-world) without collapsing the two terms into one. Within the hermeneutic relation, 
‘embodiment’ can seem also to occur, as the perceptual terminus involved is inhabited by 
perception (in Merleau-Ponty’s account). However, this ‘hermeneutic-embodiment’ is not 
transparent to the extent of embodiment relations and distinguishing here is important. 
                                                          
66Therefore, this is not equivalent to Heidegger’s present-at-hand and ready-to-hand distinction. See Ihde, Technics 
and Praxis, 120. 
67 Meaning the platform that shows me what is happening within the virtual: the operating system. 
68 Ihde, “Phenomenology of Technics.” 545. 
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Hermeneutic relations as the terminus of perceptions are useful in that they allow humans to 
access ideas about things in the world that are not clearly relatable through our existing modes of 
perception, but the price for this is that we cannot act through them (qua hermeneutic artifacts) in 
the same way that we embody other artifacts. 
The two types of relations described above exist on a continuum (concerned with how 
transparent/opaque my use of an artifact is), as we shift from the embodiment relation to the 
hermeneutic, a different character emerges (as described above). While these two relations are 
not the only ones that Ihde describes,69 their existence as variations on a continuum represents 
the substantial shift which can facilitate a point of existential ambiguity. I will return to this point 
after continuing the overview of this relational model. 
Another feature of the model and arguably the most important is the ‘enigma position’: 
Ihde’s characterization of what is represented by the hyphen in his model (human-technology).70 
The barrier between the self and technology in the embodied relation is enigmatic, or ambiguous. 
In the case of embodied relations, what can be considered an extension of the body is 
controversial itself. In Merleau-Ponty, the affordance (meaning what an artifact allows me to do) 
of simple embodiment is accounted for by recognizing the schematic character of embodiment 
itself. However, since his main example of extended embodiment was a walking stick and not 
the complex nature of our current technologies, an updated conception is needed. The cellphone 
camera is a perfect example for this point, as it blurs the distinction between my eye and the 
camera’s aperture. The hermeneutic variant (technology-world) provides the same conundrum in 
that features of the technology and its representation of the world are two things difficult to 
distinguish. An example of ambiguity about what is read into the hermeneutic function is clear in 
                                                          
69 Ibid. Alterity and Background relations are also discussed. 
70 Ibid., 547. 
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outdated icons, such as the ‘save button’ or the ‘call button’ icons that exist to perform a function 
very different than the origin of their icons represent. The feature which solely belongs to the 
artifact can be confused with its supposed feature ‘in the world’ in this way. 
Ihde and subsequent postphenomenologists subscribe to the dual amplification71 and 
reduction model, which is essentially that any change in perception/self/world is never purely 
expansive but rather, in focusing on certain features of the world, others are diminished. A 
simple example of this in our cell phone camera example may be in its role as a substitute for 
immediate vision. Whenever I choose to use my camera to view something (to record video or 
have access to its zoom function), I am relying less on my ‘pure’ eyesight for this situation. 
Thus, I am marginally more familiar with experiencing the world through a camera and less so 
with my own eye. The camera’s abilities may amplify certain aspects of vision, but the reduction 
in this situation may be that peripheral vision is eliminated in the screen. Technology is always a 
transformation, but it does not ‘expand’ our abilities, it merely changes them (anti-positivist 
understandings of both poststructuralism and Heidegger are represented here, but without 
Heidegger’s preference for the older forms of experience). 
Another difference from classic phenomenology is how these relations with technologies 
are understood as dependent on the actual use of the artifact. A technology can exist validly in 
different ‘stable’ contexts, and the notion of ‘multistability’ attempts to account for this. The 
multistability of objects places an extra importance of the existential attitudes of towards their 
use because their purchase of abilities in the world depends on this. The necessity of specific 
forms engagement with a computer (meaning that an interaction will always be particular) is also 
due to its incorporation of purpose within an intentional arc (meaning that it arises as figure 
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through active perception in relation to my purpose for its use). I place the idea of the artifact 
into a specific interpretive framework, and this itself is variable. For example, I cannot turn on a 
computer and use its tactile and visual functions to satiate my hunger directly, but I can use it to 
alternatively obtain visual instructions to make food or discern the best restaurant option given to 
me in a list from the internet. I could also use the same functions to engage in stalking or 
harassment. These options are first conditioned by the difference in kind of my relation to 
artifacts and providing the existential ‘fit’ within how I live my life, and the second example 
shows how the use function completely changes depending on the user. Examples such as these 
show the multistability of the existential relation of the artifact, because my relation to it is not 
always the same in its context of use and could differ drastically from someone else’s approach. 
Even within the same category of my relations with a computer, it can be a different artifact for 
me. Using a digital camera (like that of a smartphone or a webcam) can be at times an extension 
of my eye and at other times a stand in for the eyes of someone else (for example if I take a 
picture for them). Underneath every postphenomenological description then lies the contingency 
of multistability.72 
‘Multistability’ is a crucial synthesis of phenomenology and poststructuralism in 
opposition to purely empirical accounts in that relations with a piece of technology are not just 
culturally contingent, but a fundamental part of human perceptions in every context. In Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, the notion of the gestalt’s rendering of figure and ground is an 
interrelated constitution of perception, and intentional perception’s continuous synthesis of 
disclosing the meaning or interpretation of the world is just that: an interrelation which is partly 
                                                          
72 Ihde also mentions the ‘intentionality’ of artifacts themselves. The tendencies for us to engage with an artifact in a 
specific way creates its intentionality. However, these intentionalities are described through my examples, so I have 
left out this concept in order to avoid one more specialized term. 
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contingent on the pole of bodily experience. In also recalling Merleau-Ponty’s idea of ‘positive 
ambiguity’, multistability provides a postphenomenological way of thinking about technology. 
Digital Technology as a Complex Relation 
 
I relate to my digital devices as both embodied artifacts and hermeneutic technologies, 
but this combined way of relating to my technology has resulted in them becoming an integral 
aspect of my daily life. Because these relations can be part of the same overall actions, thinking 
about the separate facets of my interaction is helpful for understanding the role they play in my 
life. Therefore, I will examine these two ways of relating to my computer and smartphone 
technologies. Firstly, embodiment must be discussed sufficiently to demonstrate the ambiguity 
between the embodied and the hermeneutic.  
Embodiment Relations With Digital Technology 
What is the first thing encountered when navigating digitally? Tactile interrogation finds 
the power switch of any device as its method of “awakening.” The response mechanisms provide 
feedback about the success of my efforts and begin to activate. Often there is a light which 
activates and signifies the effect of my actions, beginning the process of embodiment. The screen 
lights up and its contents correspond to my prompts through various other pieces of hardware, 
such as the mouse, keyboard, or touchscreen. My calibration is followed by the subsequent lack 
of focus on the hardware instruments, sometimes locating the experiential locus back into the 
non-digital world (in the case of a camera or audio transmission), and at other times into the 
arena of the screen (where my mouse/keyboard/touchscreen commands are solely concerned 
with manipulating the elements given to me by the design of the operating system, the software). 
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To be clear, the process is as follows: I embody the hardware (embodiment relations), there is a 
technical realm of digital files and folders that I must interpret (hermeneutic relations), and 
another change occurs depending on the features of the computer or phone that I use, like using a 
camera versus playing a social video game. 
In the first case, I seem to be acting not only through the hardware of the technology so 
as to activate it, but also perceptually through the whole of the device towards some transformed 
but isomorphic (meaning analogous to a biologically prior perceptual faculty) noematic content. 
I use my phone to see the world through the camera function, or I use it to play sound to make 
my location experientially different. It is less of an object of my gaze or hearing and more of a 
capacity to accomplish my visual or aural intentions through a transformation of my perceptual 
situation. How I incorporate these features into my overall intentional arc determines this degree 
of transparency. I continue to engage with the world through my biological body’s capacities, but 
with the aid of technology to alter their characters. My understanding of self is implicated in this 
for the reason that I am fundamentally entangled with the world as a shifting network of 
perceptions and capabilities. Phenomenologically, my relations to digital devices happen as part 
of my overall interaction with the world. So they as long as they are working properly, I can 
anticipate their transformations without issue.73 
A closer look at the structure of embodiment may be helpful. If I am unfamiliar with the 
calling feature of a smartphone and operate it in this way, more focus is placed on the interface 
and its difference from my ‘normal’ voice and ear than if I am very familiar with talking on the 
phone. However, the relation remains one of embodiment, although its opacity (what is not 
transparently known to me) differs. Each body schema is also different in relationship to this 
                                                          
73 Of course, this is not guaranteed, as there are many ways to interact with any piece of technology. Insofar as the 
technology is acted through, the anticipated transformations are potential means of engaging with the world. 
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technology, as the automatic caller has a larger degree of existential identity invested in this 
capacity of calling. The character of embodiment relations is a perceptual transformation, albeit 
one with a certain amount of opacity, which facilitates the body schema’s transformation by its 
very difference from the biological body. When I look through the camera of my smartphone, 
part of my noematic structure is focused on the difference between the objects in the camera and 
normal vision, and this difference is the camera itself. The camera itself recedes 
phenomenologically, which is what makes it opaque. Therein, looking through the camera 
facilitates a difference in how I orient myself within a particular context. Its capacity to 
decentralize the noetic activity facilitates a new existence by providing me a different way of 
relating to objects through the camera. As the basis for intentional consciousness is that, through 
the various perceptual faculties, one’s existence is always between the objects of the perceptual 
field, my use of technology in embodiment relations is not alienating or new in principle. In the 
words of Ingrid Richardson, “That we can oscillate between, conflate and adapt to ostensibly 
disparate modes of being and perceiving – i.e. to being simultaneously 'here' and 'there' – is 
precisely why telepresence and virtual space are ontologically tolerable.”74 Merleau-Ponty’s 
embodiment already has shown this as it applies to the biological body, and the same description 
is accurate for the schematic inclusion of technological extensions.  
These transformations existentially allow for changed conceptions of the self, because the 
intentional arc incorporates different capacities. A self embodied through technologies that 
extend or transform the perceptual terminus incorporates these perceptions into the overall arc 
when navigating the perceptual field.75 In other words, I have different types of abilities with 
                                                          
74 Ingrid Richardson, " Mobile Technosoma: some phenomenological reflections on itinerant media devices," 
Fibreculture 6 (2005). 
75 See Rettie, “Presence and Embodiment,” 20. 
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which I can disclose the nature of the ambiguous world, and the character of the world in which I 
live features different kinds of perceptual experiences. 
Another example of this is when, in the use of social media, the filtered world perceived 
through a camera then alters the potential navigation of the physical world in that it becomes a 
world where cameras may be considered as a factor of constructing figure from ground. 
Alternatively, a nonvisual example is the retrieval of audio from some internet database, such as 
an air horn website that can play the sound at will. It is both an extension of my capacity to 
create sound and the ear because the sound is an intended utterance while at the same time 
‘artificially’ coloring the auditory qualities of any given context. Therein, the embodiment 
configuration has phenomenological and existential implications, as the correlation between 
noetic and noematic components of existence is demonstrated.  
However, the consequences of embodiment are certainly difficult to generalize, 
particularly with respect to interconnected technologies present in computers and smartphones. 
For instance, Ruth Rettie describes accounts of talking on the phone that create a conflict 
between two physical places, resulting in a sort of ‘third virtual place’ in between the places 
where the two conversations happen.76 We can interpret this as a positive experience of 
indeterminacy, but in qualifying this with the multistability of relations, my experiences with 
digital embodiment are always contingent. For many people, the ‘telepresence’ may be so 
familiar of an experience, one so integrated into the possibilities of the world that at any moment, 
contact from anyone in the world is possible in this space. On the other hand, even if I can 
capably embody the phone as a transparent extension, its actual use may seem awkward or 
intimidating to me. Existentially, the phone discourages itself as a possibility for action due to 
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my anxiety over its use even if I am technically proficient with it. In this way, the 
postphenomenological approach is not concerned with uncovering some essence of how 
technologies always impact our lives, instead it examines possibilities of ways we can 
understand the world and live differently in it.77 
One complication of discussing digital technology is that it is much more than an 
embodied tool. My phone and computer can contain features that are embodied, as I have just 
described, but they are also a system to be interpreted on its own terms. When I use the camera, 
audio recorder, these are stored as files on my computer’s memory. They become digital objects 
that mean something to me. How I relate to this larger ‘user interface’ of the computer is a 
question that cannot be divorced from my interaction with technology. While 
postphenomenology places importance on maintaining a close connection with actual 
technologies, dividing up the use of such aspects of a single artifact would be problematic 
because their combined capacities are mutually influenced in how they function and because 
they are incorporated through the same digital kind of technology. My computer and smartphone 
contain interrelated digital abilities that can be accessed by each one or both. These abilities are 
experienced as departing from the same artifact, as well as being distributed between them. How 
the of separate facets of a single type of artifact integrate is the question to be examined, and this 
is the previously mentioned relationship between the embodied and hermeneutic relations. I will 
next describe how I relate hermeneutically to the technologies in question. 
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Hermeneutic Relations with Digital Technology 
In many of my interactions with computers, I am actually perceiving the artifact itself. I 
inhabit the world of my digital artifacts when I interact with the files on my computer and their 
context within an operating system. In my preceding descriptions of embodiment, I incorporate 
the artifact into my intentional arc as extended capacities of my biological body schema. When I 
decide to browse the internet, I often am focused on the contents of the virtual world itself. 
Hermeneutic relations maintain the perceptual terminus on the features of the artifact, and this 
describes my actions in this instance of using a digital device. In other words, I see, feel, and 
hear the computer more as something that exists as a meaningful to interact with, rather than 
through. It has a higher degree of opacity and so is perceived more as a figure of my perception, 
rather than receding into the background. 
How do the artifacts in this way function within my existence as a whole? Although 
interacting with a hermeneutic object seems to involve a kind of ‘embodiment’, it is merely one 
which is disclosed by interacting with it as characteristics of its internal logic (which then point 
to some abstract characteristics of the world). Since I am perceiving the digital contents as my 
perceptual terminus, ‘embodiment’ in this sense is only so in the way Merleau-Ponty describes 
the intentional process of interacting with the world, and similarly, I come to understand the 
nature of the digital world by acting within it. 
Ihde’s postphenomenological framework helps clear up some of the contention of how I 
relate to computers in their primary capacities as computers. While there seems to be a degree of 
‘isomorphism’ (retaining a character analogous to existing modes of perception) between my 
biological body and some computer functions (like my cursor possibly being a correlate to the 
hand), and this is enough to have warranted some authors to draw the conclusions that the 
46 
 
computer is actually embodied transparently, the perceptual transparency is missing from my use 
of it. When I browse my computer or connect to the internet, whether or not I recognize what my 
actions comprise in an existential sense, I maintain the visual (and often aural) presence of the 
instrument itself in my perception. Its features are the figures arising in my intentional arc that I 
apprehend as objects in the world. My screen contains contents that are meaningful in their 
representations, not in their transformation of existing forms of perception.78 In the following 
section, examples are given to highlight this relation more thoroughly. 
Joohan Kim’s analysis of ‘digital being’ views the computer “As a processor, transmitter, 
and storage of human perceptions” that “becomes an extension of our body.”79 While this seems 
correct for features like the camera, the thing which “processes”, “transmits,” and “stores,” is not 
an extension of our body schema in the same sense. It can be a way for my intentional arc to 
encompass and synthesize the meaning of world in which I act, but not one which alters my 
perceptual disposition from the beginning as something that recedes into the background. A 
reference back to the ‘enigma position’ of Ihde’s model is applicable here; when I arrange, share, 
and store the digital files (and applications to an extent) on my computer or smartphone, I 
interpret their existences as close to being features of the world itself. In a similar way to how 
reading a book points to a meaning beyond itself while retaining the words/sentences as figures 
directing my perceptions, so do computer interfaces. The context in which my embodied 
experiences (camera, voice, etc.) exist as extensions of my actions (programs, apps etc.) is also 
one that contains its own (designed) logic that must be learned and interpreted. Kim mentions 
that many of the ways “digital objects” function depart significantly from the way the physical 
                                                          
78 Of course, this disjunction is not pure: embodiment/hermeneutic relations exist on a spectrum of their isomorphic 
opacity. As one moves along this spectrum, how I relate existentially to the artifact takes on a different character. 
79 Joohan Kim, "Phenomenology of Digital-being," Human Studies 24, no. 1-2 (2001): 102. 
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world works.80 The synthetic representations of perceptive dispositions in the digital world are 
unconventional, and this requires me to focus more closely on the technology itself. In other 
words, how I incorporate the computer into my life is less a matter of transforming my biological 
forms of interacting with the world and more of an abstract interpretation of some features of the 
world. 
Kim seems to affirm this description: 
The usefulness of individual digital tools is also determined in the context of a totality of 
useful digital things. For example, the usefulness of a word processing program is 
determined by a total computing environment which usually consists of operating 
systems, font programs, spelling and grammar check programs, drivers, macros as well as 
component programs for the basic functions like saving, opening, formatting, printing, 
styling and table making. These numerous programs provide the "accommodations" for 
the word processor.81 
 
It is in this way that my relations with digital technology are often of the hermeneutic variety, 
and my world is existentially transformed in this capacity. When I exist in a world where 
knowledge is readily available for me to learn via Google and Wikipedia, my perception of 
things which I do not know (the origin of a particular food item, for example) exist as potentially 
knowable things, were I to put in the effort of Googling.82 Another example may be the way my 
world now contains the ability to transfer money in my bank account via the internet at any given 
time. Of course, the reduction element of these abilities is that I am now responsible for my 
ignorance of facts or my bank balance due to these new capabilities, but it is also that my 
knowledge and financial situations are features of my world that are less connected to my 
experience of buildings, like libraries and physical bank buildings. In this way, my world is 
                                                          
80 Ibid., 94, 107. Of course, Kim is not employing Ihde’s framework here, but this description can be examine 
through this nonetheless. 
81 Ibid., 95. 
82 Of course, this is not to say that searching the internet for information is universally applied to every unknown 
experience or that the information found is as accurate to me as firsthand experience. The point here is only that this 
capacity is now incorporated into my intentional arc of perception insofar as I am of the habit of using it. 
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transformed with the inclusion of these possibilities that are accessible in different ways than 
before.  
Graham Harmon (talking about the philosophy of Marshal and Eric McLuhan) gives 
salient examples of this:  
Electronic mail enhances rapid communication, discarding the snail-mail pace of 
aeroplanes and ships that once haunted paper messages. Search engines enhance memory 
by granting immediate access to forgotten names and facts, which once required months 
of timid queries to library staff…The price of such enhancement is always ‘privation of 
alternative potentials’, since every decision cuts off other potential decisions 
(obsolescence), and overcommits us to whatever step has been taken.83 
 
As I am always in the process of disclosing the world through my interactions with it, every 
ability that I exercise changes the nature of existence in some way. Incorporating technology in 
this hermeneutic sense gives me the ability to manipulate more abstract features of how I relate 
to the world from my digital devices. But again, the digital is not only this for me; it contains 
many features that correlate with and transform my body. For example, my use of Google Maps 
is accomplished by ‘reading’ it in the hermeneutic sense. Nevertheless, this technology offers the 
ability view the world from the position of the ‘Street View’, which seems to correlate with 
‘ordinary’ visual perception. Because these two interactions are interconnected, a discussion of 
my relation with them together is what needs to be described next.  
The Ambiguity of Combined Relations 
Because our digital technologies are so multifaceted, our interactions with them highlight 
especially well the concept of multistability. I experience the embodiment of the camera, audio 
recordings, or communicative features within both the ‘real world’ context (embodiment) and 
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within the digital environment (hermeneutic). When many different kinds embodiment types 
relate to each other within a single context (the digital), my intentional being also incorporates 
the features of both relations differently. Conversely, when I use my digital technology, I often 
incorporate its features into my embodiment relations. Instead of only relating to all of these 
embodied features either through their respective ways of interacting with the world (my 
listening to recorded music and taking pictures being the purview of different abilities) or 
combining to create a more “’complete’ experience,”84 the combined interaction results in a 
transformed, novel way of experiencing the world. The ‘simple’ perceptual transformations of 
each specific feature remain in such a complex technology, but these combined are not just 
‘equal to the sum of their parts’. They mutually inform each other to create a different kind of 
relation altogether.85 
 Here is a simple example to demonstrate: I must unlock my smartphone with touch or 
sound (embodiment relations) and navigate the series of steps of opening the application within 
the user interface (hermeneutic relations) in order to access the camera function (embodiment 
relations), and my camera offers itself to my perception of its role as something that can be 
instantly shared or saved (hermeneutic relations). Now, every piece of technology always has its 
own conditions for use, its own ‘internal logic,’86 but the fact that all of these embodied features 
(camera, headphones, voice transmission) are now components of the same internal system of 
navigation has resulted in the system itself creating the context for embodiment. Digital artifacts 
are incorporated into my life as features of the world to be interpreted and as tool-like artifacts 
through which I perceive the world in a different way. My world of relating to cameras is now 
                                                          
84 Kiran, “Four Dimensions,” 129. 
85 See Richardson, “Mobile Technosoma.” 
86 All I mean here is that I have to engage with a technology in some specific way that is different in some way than 
other things. 
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often combined with my world of conducting financial transactions: I can deposit a check by 
taking a picture of it. My capacity to discover the identity of a popular song I hear in public is 
part of the same technology with which I call my parents (or send them the song).87 All of this is 
accomplished through the same device (or device type), and thus, my hermeneutic interpretation 
of my technology becomes also a hermeneutic interpretation of the meaning of my embodied 
capacities. Conversely, the drive towards transparency which characterizes embodiment relations 
influences my relations with the virtual space. My computer shows me different ways of 
channeling my perception back into the world, as seen not only in the rise of smartphones in 
society but also in the inclusion of better webcams and interconnected platforms like ‘smart 
home’ devices. Digital spaces do not always reference a corresponding material entity itself, and 
websites themselves are not simple representations of physical spaces but rather the spaces 
where one’s perception can terminate and gather new meaning about the world. However, since 
the digital space incorporates many features to which I embody, my existential relation to my 
capabilities changes. My capacity to enjoy a song is part of the same capacity to be able to share 
it; my desire for going to a museum is inextricable from my desire to ‘save’ that moment in a 
picture. These examples show some unique stabilities of our relations with complex 
technologies. 
In discussing the different ‘levels’ in which we live, Merleau-Ponty states that “each of 
the whole succession of our experiences, including the first, passes on an already acquired 
spatiality.”88 My intentional arc informs my future with my previous experiences, and this is the 
condition in which I live regardless of any technologies I use. When considering the experience 
                                                          
87 SoundHound is an app that can identify most songs just by ‘listening’ to music playing in world. It can then share 
the songs or save them to a repository, all within the context of my smartphone. 
88 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 253. 
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of being situated in and navigating any particular facet of my life, the nature of my situation 
carries into this arena the disposition of an incorporated schema. My experiences of interacting 
with the world in one sense informs all the rest. In navigating the virtual realms, my interactions 
maintain the connection to physical schemas even though they are not embodied, and my digital 
devices allow this connection itself to be explored through its implementation in their very 
design. 
The existential consequences of my consistent digital interactions are described by Kirk 
Besmer, and he mentions how virtual interactions in dating games can impact those in the ‘real 
world’. 
In discussing some empirical literature, Besmer states,  
…studies indicate that bodily-based behaviors occurring in virtual exchanges with avatars 
of other people are occasionally carried back into subsequent real-world behaviors. For 
example, in online dating games, making an avatar more attractive than the user actually 
is not only boosted the user’s self-confidence in social exchanges in the virtual world, but 
the improved self-perception also persisted outside of the virtual dating game in 
subsequent real-world social exchanges.89 
 
In this example, the experiences in the virtual environment, despite being perceptually quite 
different from situations involving different technologies, nevertheless transformed the way that 
the user interacted with the world. While specific artifacts may reshape potential experiences in a 
fundamental way instead of just adding new capacities, my relations with them are contingent. 
The conditions which one finds oneself in when accessing is vastly different depending on the 
specific item due to both personal and design aspects of how the thing is used.90 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
89 Kirk Besmer, “What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals about Virtual Re-embodiment: A Note on the Extension 
Thesis,” in Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, eds. Robert Rosenberger 
and Peter-Paul Verbeek (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 57. Here, he is quoting Blascovich J., and J. Bailenson, 
Infinite Reality: Avatars, Eternal Life, New Worlds, and the Dawn of the Virtual Revolution (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2011). 
90 Jeffrey A. Clements and Randall Boyle, "Compulsive Technology Use: Compulsive Use of Mobile Applications," 
Computers in Human Behavior 87 (2018): 45-46. 
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thinking about these transformations with a postphenomenological approach gives us a 
framework for examining our relationship, and because no single trajectory adequately describes 
the way technology is shaping our behavior. Our interactions have consequences, but our 
condition is malleable as well. 
Conclusion 
One way of characterizing this situation with complex technologies is with the idea of 
Augmented Reality (AR). Pokémon Go and Google Glass are both popular examples or 
technologies that inscribe hermeneutic features directly onto mediated perceptions. Verbeek and 
Rosenberger have categorized this augmented reality relation. They use Google Glass, a ‘smart’ 
pair of eyeglasses as an example:  
“When using Google Glass, people both have an embodiment relation with the Glass 
itself, and a hermeneutic relation with its screen that offers a representation of the world. 
Therefore it offers not one, but two parallel relations with the world. Schematically: 
(I - Technology) → World 
    ↘ (Technology – World)  
The intentionality involved in such “augmentation relations” can be indicated as 
“bifurcated”: there is a split in people’s directedness at the world, because two parallel 
fields of attention emerge.”91  
 
Many of the previous examples given concerning the use of combined embodiment/hermeneutic 
relations could actually be categorized in this way. What is important about AR technologies is 
that the hermeneutic aspects are combined with the embodiment from the start. Their interrelated 
capacities are shown explicitly to be what they are, and my relations with them are existentially 
distinct in that, as seen in the above model, there is an enigma position between both 
myself/technology and technology/world. AR seems to build the ambiguity of the distinction 
                                                          
91 Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek, “A Field Guide to Postphenomenology,” in Postphenomenological 
Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, eds. Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2015), 22. 
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between embodied and hermeneutically-embodied technologies explicitly into the design of the 
artifact.  
Galit Wellner has written about how the smartphone has become the primary method of 
reaching “augmented space.”92 This space is a sort of interactive hybrid that collaborates with 
many technologies. 
Wellner shows the difference between virtual reality (VR) and (AR):  
Whereas virtual reality attempts to reproduce visual and auditory perceptions, augmented 
reality returns to the real world and provides no more than a visual or vocal addendum. 
This addendum is structured as an overlay that is ‘the layering of dynamic and context-
specific information over the visual field of a user,’ or over the vocal field.”93 
 
In examining the kinds of interactions I have not just with smartphones, but computer technology 
in general, this characterization seems accurate for many of my relations. My hermeneutic 
interaction with digital devices seen in the examples considered in this paper often incorporate 
the ‘real world’ instead of simply remaining circumscribed in the digital space. While Wellner 
considers the smartphone’s mobility as a crucial factor of its capacity for AR, I would contend 
that the complex computers that we have function as AR without this extensive mobility. 
                                                          
92 However, she does expand the definition of smartphone. Wellner has also designated some transformations in the 
screen-design cellphone technologies as indicative of their becoming a ‘quasi-other’. Under this conception, the 
cellphone is to me an opaque subject-like being to which I relate. While this seems correct concerning some levels 
of automation in digital tech (like algorithmic content regulation of some online experience or the way programs and 
applications unfold), the experience of the screen itself as a ‘quasi-face’ does not seem entirely accurate. For one, 
while the interface of the screen certainly offers a sort of ‘interiority’ that puts its parameters into special focus 
(especially considering its backlit, animated character), my manipulation of its features directly is not analogous to a 
face. My relation to others is one in which they are viewed as an opaque entity which relates equally to myself. 
Considering how I must navigate it to understand it and can even learn about various aspects of its design and code, 
I relate to it more often as a hermeneutic feature. Another obvious fact about my use of the screen is that it is 
extensively text-based. I can try to know the meaning of a webpage’s contents by reading the words written all over 
it despite not always knowing the author, and interpretive relations like this are more accurately characterized by the 
hermeneutic framework. Wellner’s analysis here is correct in that some features of the smartphone contain this 
‘quasi-otherness’, but they are one kind of feature among many in the hermeneutic digital world. See Galit Wellner, 
"The Quasi-face of the Cell Phone: Rethinking Alterity and Screens," Human Studies 37, no. 3 (2014): 311-12. 
93 Galit Wellner, "No Longer a Phone: The Cellphone as an Enabler of Augmented Reality," Transfers 3, no. 2 
(2013): 72. 
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Computers are almost ubiquitous, and many of the tasks I want to accomplish can be done so 
from any computer. Because the artifacts are also interpreted hermeneutically, they are features 
of the world in which the space I occupy is made meaningful. Wellner says that “Through 
embodiment relations, the smartphone offers new understandings of the world. It renders the 
environment more intelligible through the new embodiment (and hermeneutic) relations it 
offers.”94 In this way, computers and smartphones, because they offer complex interactions 
between embodiment relations and hermeneutic ones, can be understood as facilitating AR. 
The potential/anticipatory95 structure of perception is influenced by the use of these 
complex digital artifacts by giving me additional way of interacting with the world. While the 
existence of the world is indubitable, the nature of one’s navigation of it can be altered through 
the discursive relationship of consciousness and its objects with the body. When I interact with 
my phone or computer, my existence seems different in that I can always turn the devices off do 
other things. But a disjunction between the two worlds, one in the physical world and the other 
of my digital interactions, is not a disjunction at all. Furthermore, the explicit integration of two 
different ways of relating to technology provides a positive sense of some new ways of 
interacting with the world in general. 
Merleau-Ponty writes, 
Whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an ‘I 
think’, it is a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium. 
Sometimes a new cluster of meanings is formed: our former movements are integrated 
into a fresh motor entity, the first visual data into a fresh sensory entity, our natural 
powers suddenly come together in a richer meaning, which hitherto has been merely 
foreshadowed in our perceptual or practical field, and which has made itself felt in our 
experience by no more than a certain lack, and which by its coming suddenly reshuffles 
the elements of our equilibrium and fulfills our blind expectation.96 
                                                          
94 Ibid., 81. 
95 This refers back to myself being an ‘I can’. When I act, I am anticipating my abilities (which are hitherto potential 
abilities). 
96 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 153. 
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Our multistable relations with technology can account for different ‘equilibriums’ that exist as 
stable ‘powers’ in our interactions with the world, all depending on how we incorporate them 
into our lives. There is no single way for us to interact with technology. Digital technologies give 
us the ability to have embodied experiences, store or share them, read and manipulate them, or 
inscribe our capacity to read onto embodied perceptions to create a synthesis. While we cannot 
generalize about placing values onto the use of technologies, the possible transformations I have 
outlined can help to discourage unwarranted bleak generalizations about technology as a whole: 
they can also give our world a richer meaning. Given our multistable relationship with every 
artifact and the way that these relations can inform our very subjectivities, transforming the 
world into ‘standing-reserve’ seems to be only one possible outcome among numerous others.97 
Our condition is not guaranteed, but it is one that we commit to every time we use our devices 
which ultimately characterizes our existence as being composed of certain actions and not 
others.  
In this paper I have examined two works of phenomenology that relate to technology as 
well as some challenges from poststructuralism, given examples of how postphenomenological 
descriptions can apply to digital technology, and shown how these devices often function as 
complex transformations of our experiences by considering that we often relate to them through 
both embodiment and hermeneutic relations. With the inclusion of AR into our lives, perhaps the 
consequences of using digital technologies can be explicitly designed into the artifacts 
themselves, giving us awareness of how our actions compose the nature of our existence in the 
world. 
 
                                                          
97 See Heidegger, “Question,” 310. 
56 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor W., and Anson G. Rabinbach. "Culture Industry Reconsidered." New German 
Critique 6 (1975): 12-19. 
 
Bailey, Chris. "Your Smartphone Is Chopping Your Life into Tiny, Less Meaningful Pieces." A 
Life of Productivity.com. August 14, 2018. https://alifeofproductivity.com/smartphone-is-
making-your-life-less-meaningful/. 
 
Barthes, Roland. “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.” In A Barthes Reader. 
Edited by Susan Sontag, 251-95. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
 
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994.  
 
Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-
Chevallier. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 
 
Beauvoir, Simone. The Ethics of Ambiguity. Translated by Bernard Frechtman. New York: 
Kensington Publishing Corp, 1948. 
 
Bernet, Rudolf, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach, Editors. “The Lifeworld, Both as a Problem 
Concerning the Foundation of the Objective Sciences and as a Problem Concerning 
Universal Being and Truth. In An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology 217-228. 
Northwestern University Press, 1999. 
 
Besmer, Kirk. “What Robotic Re-embodiment Reveals about Virtual Re-embodiment: A Note on 
the Extension Thesis.” In Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on 
Human/Technology Relations, edited by Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek, 55-
71. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
 
Bødker, Susanne. "Understanding Representation in Design." Human-Computer Interaction 13, 
no. 2 (1998): 107-125. 
 
Bogost, Ian. Play Anything: The Pleasure of Limits, the Uses of Boredom, and the Secret of 
Games. Narrated by Jonathan Yen. Newark: Audible, 2016. Audiobook. 
 
Bosker, Bianca. "The Binge Breaker: Tristan Harris Believes Silicon Valley is Addicting Us to 
Our Phones. He’s Determined to Make it Stop." The Atlantic Monthly 318, no. 2. (2016). 
56-58,60,62,64-65. 
 
57 
 
Bostrom, Nick. “The Future of Humanity.” In New Waves in Philosophy of Technology 186-215. 
Edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Soren Riis. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. 
 
Boulé, Jean-Pierre. "Thinking with Sartre." Sartre Studies International 12, no. 2 (2006): 101-13. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23511011 
 
Bridle, James. New Dark Age: Technology, Knowledge and the End of the Future. London: 
Verso Books, 2018. 
 
Clements, Jeffrey A., and Randall Boyle. "Compulsive Technology Use: Compulsive Use of 
Mobile Applications." Computers in Human Behavior 87 (2018): 34-48. 
 
Dash, Anil. "12 Things Everyone Should Understand About Tech." Anil Dash.com. April 7, 
2018. Accessed March 22, 2019. https://anildash.com/2018/04/07/12-things-everyone-
should-understand-about-tech/. 
 
Dixon, Steve. “Cybernetic-Existentialism.” International Journal of Performance Arts and 
Digital Media 12, no.1, (2016): 11-30, DOI: 10.1080/14794713.2016.1163833 
 
Due, Reitar. “Freedom, Nothingness, Consciousness: Some Remarks on the Structure of Being 
and Nothingness.” Sartre Studies International 11, no. 1&2 (2005): 31-42. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Body/Power.” In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977 55-62. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Preface.” In The Order of Things. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Truth and Power.” In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977 109-133. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 
 
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books, 1959. 
  
Harman, Graham. “The McLuhans and Metaphysics.” In New Waves in Philosophy of 
Technology 100-122. Edited by Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Soren Riis. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 
Harris, Tristan. "How Technology Hijacks People's Minds - from a Magician and Google's 
Design Ethicist." Tristan Harris.com. May 19, 2016. Accessed March 22, 2019. 
http://www.tristanharris.com/2016/05/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-minds - from-a-
magician-and-googles-design-ethicist/. 
 
58 
 
Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” In Philosophy of Technology, The 
Technological Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Scharff and Val 
Dusek, 305-317. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. “Pure Phenomenology, its Method, and its Field of Investigation.” In The 
Phenomenology Reader, edited by Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney, 124-133. New 
York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. “The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy by Inquiring 
back from the Pregiven Life-World.” In The Phenomenology Reader, edited by Dermot 
Moran and Timothy Mooney, 151-174. New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Ihde, Don. “A Phenomenology of Technics.” In Philosophy of Technology, The Technological 
Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek, 539-
560. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
 
Ihde, Don. "Heidegger on Technology: One Size Fits All." Philosophy Today 54, no. Supplement 
(2010): 101-105. 
 
Ihde, Don. "Postphenomenological Re-embodiment." Foundations of Science 17, no. 4 (2012): 
373-377. 
 
Ihde, Don. “Preface: Positioning Postphenomenology.” In Postphenomenological Investigations: 
Essays on Human/Technology Relations, edited by Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul 
Verbeek, vii-xvi. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
 
Ihde, Don. Technics and Praxis. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979. 
 
Ihde, Don, and Evan Selinger. "Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines." Human Studies 27, 
no. 4 (2004): 361-376. 
 
Karimova, Gulnara Z., and Amir Shirkhanbeik. "Society of Things: An Alternative Vision of 
Internet of Things." Cogent Social Sciences 1, no. 1 (2015): 1115654. 
 
Kim, Joohan. "Phenomenology of Digital-being." Human Studies 24, no. 1-2 (2001): 87-111. 
 
Kiran, Asle H. “Four Dimensions of Technological Mediation.” In Postphenomenological 
Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, edited by Robert Rosenberger 
and Peter-Paul Verbeek, 123-40. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
 
Klein, Ezra, and Cal Newport. “Cal Newport on Doing Deep Work and Escaping Social Media.” 
Produced by Vox. The Ezra Klein Show. April 18, 2017. Podcast, MP3 audio, 1:20:18. 
59 
 
Accessed March 22, 2019. https://player.fm/series/the-ezra-klein-show/cal-newport-on-
doing-deep-work-and-escaping-social-media. 
 
Latour, Bruno. “Actor Network Theory.” In Philosophy of Technology, The Technological 
Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek, 278-
288. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
 
Lombaard, Christo. “Fleetingness and Media-ted Existence. From Kierkegaard on the 
Newspaper to Broderick on the Internet.” Communicatio: South African Journal for 
Communication Theory and Research 35, no. 1, (2009):17-29, DOI: 
10.1080/02500160902969057 
 
McCullough, Malcolm. "On Typologies of Situated Interaction." Human-Computer Interaction 
16, no. 2 (2001): 337-349. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. 
 
Mendieta, Eduardo. "Bodies of Technology." Journal of Applied Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2003): 
95-101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24354990. 
 
Mitcham, Carl. “Three Ways of Being-With Technology.” In Philosophy of Technology, The 
Technological Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Scharff and Val 
Dusek, 523-538. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
 
Rettie, Ruth. "Presence and Embodiment in Mobile Phone Communication." PsychNology 
Journal 3, no. 1 (2005): 16-34. 
 
Richardson, Ingrid. " Mobile Technosoma: some phenomenological reflections on itinerant 
media devices." Fibreculture 6 (2005). 
 
Rosenberger, Robert, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. “A Field Guide to Postphenomenology.” In 
Postphenomenological Investigations: Essays on Human/Technology Relations, edited by 
Robert Rosenberger and Peter-Paul Verbeek, 9-41. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
 
Rosenberger, Robert, and Peter-Paul Verbeek (Eds.). Postphenomenological Investigations: 
Essays on Human/Technology Relations. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015. 
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. “Introduction and Part One: The Problem of Nothingness,” In Being and 
Nothingness xlv-70. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 
1956. 
 
60 
 
Schaik, Paul van, and Jonathan Ling. "An Experimental Analysis of Experiential and Cognitive 
Variables in Web Navigation." Human–Computer Interaction 27, no. 3 (2012): 199-234. 
 
Scippa, Gaetano. “John Moose, the Band You Can Listen to Only in a Forest.” LifeGate.com. 
Last modified June 26, 2015. https://www.lifegate.com/people/lifestyle/john-moose-
band-forest. 
 
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. “Postphenomenology of Technology.” In Philosophy of Technology, The 
Technological Condition: An Anthology, 2nd edition, edited by Robert C. Scharff and Val 
Dusek, 561-572. West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
 
Wellner, Galit. "No Longer a Phone: The Cellphone as an Enabler of Augmented Reality." 
Transfers 3, no. 2 (2013): 70-88. 
 
Wellner, Galit. "The Quasi-face of the Cell Phone: Rethinking Alterity and Screens." Human 
Studies 37, no. 3 (2014): 299-316. 
 
Wittkower, D. "Facebook and dramauthentic identity: A post-Goffmanian theory of identity 
performance on SNS." First Monday [Online] 19 no. 4 (2 April 2014). 
 
Yadav, Dylan. “Sigur Rós' ‘Route One’ Experiment Captures Iceland With Technology.” 
Immortal Reviews.com. Last modified April 29, 2018. 
http://www.immortalreviews.com/home/2018/4/29/sigur-rs-route-one-experiment-
captures-iceland-with-technology. 
